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1. Introduction 
Human-capital accumulation is expected to be the driving engine of economic growth 
and development in the new century. Hence human-capital policy should be highly 
ranked on the agenda. Unfortunately, the economic understanding of optimal human-
capital policy is still in its infancy. In particular, an integrated approach is still lacking 
which allows one to cope with the various sources of tax distortions and market 
failure. Economic analysis is rather eclectic in this field. The list of issues researched 
is long. It covers reasons of potential market failure such as positive external effects of 
education, incomplete markets for educational loans, and missing private opportunities 
to insure against educational risks. It extends to issues raised by distortionary taxation 
and includes key words such as income uncertainty (Eaton and Rosen, 1980; Varian, 
1980), informational asymmetry (Mirrlees, 1971), credibility of government policy 
(Boadway et al., 1996; Andersson and Konrad, 2003), and asymmetric income 
taxation of human and physical capital (Heckman, 1976; Nerlove et al., 1993; Nielsen 
and Sörensen, 1997), to mention just a few prominent ones.  
One of the areas where systematic analysis has only begun is that of the imperfect 
taxation of rent income generated by the endogenous choice of education. The analysis 
has been triggered off by some numerical simulations carried through by Trostel 
(1993) on the basis of a representative-agent general-equilibrium model. This study 
finds a significant negative effect of proportional income taxation on human capital. 
By means of further simulation experiments, Trostel (1996) shows that it is second-
best efficient to supplement an income tax with a subsidy to higher education. In 
independent theoretical studies Wigger (2003 and 2004) and Bovenberg and Jacobs 
(2005) look more closely at the question of when educational subsidies are efficiency-
enhancing. These studies differ from Trostel (1996) and the present one in the attempt 
to integrate two sources of imperfections in one single model: the imperfect taxation of 
rent income generated by education, and the imperfect taxation of rent income 
generated by informational asymmetry in the Mirrlees tradition. Although similar in 
design, the studies suggest strikingly different conclusions. Whereas Bovenberg and 
Jacobs (2005) find strong theoretical evidence for subsidizing human-capital 5
investment, Wigger (2004) proves that social welfare can never be increased by 
supplementing a nonlinear income tax with a subsidy to higher education. The 
conclusions raise the question less of who is right or wrong than of which modelling 
features are able to explain such contradictory results. This is where the present paper 
ties in. It offers a simple framework of analysis which allows one to give structure to a 
strand of literature which threatens to become more and more confusing. It does so by 
going one step back in the literature and returning to the isolated analysis of the effects 
that the imperfect taxation of ability rents has on efficient human-capital policy. It is 
the author’s strong belief that these effects have not been well understood till now and 
that they are of key importance for the design of optimal human-capital policy.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model of a representative 
taxpayer, with the only endogenous choices concerning education and labour supply. 
Returns to education are decreasing and are the source of rent income, which cannot 
be fully skimmed off by a proportional tax on consumption. As a result, the production 
efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) is not applicable. Section 3 
introduces policy instruments and the planner’s objective function. In Section 4 it is 
shown to be efficient not to distort educational decisions. Only distortions in the 
supply of labour should be tolerated. The result is illustrated by means of an example 
in Section 5. Section 6 derives the result that it is second-best efficient to tax labour 
income regressively with respect to qualification and to restore efficiency in education 
by taxing its monetary cost. If regressive labour taxation is politically not feasible, this 
leads us to study third-best policies. Options are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 deals 
with the question to what extent education subsidies are needed to enhance efficiency. 
Section 9 highlights the conflict between distributive equity and efficiency in 
education. Section 10 summarizes. Major proofs are relegated to a technical Appendix.  
2. A representative household model 
Consider a representative household which has to choose between supplying 
nonqualified and qualified labour,  and , respectively. The household derives  l L h L6
utility  from consumption C and the two differentiated forms of labour. 
Nonqualified labour has to be divided between time spent in the market,  , and 
time spent on education, E. It earns a constant wage rate 
) , , ( h l L L C U
E Ll 
l Z  if supplied to the market. 
The productivity of qualified labour depends on the amount of education. The choice 
of E is part of the household’s optimization problem. Qualified labour is paid 
) (E H h Z , where  h Z  is constant while the earnings function H(E) displays positive but 
diminishing returns, Hc >0>Hcc. It is well known that the aggregate empirical earnings 
function tends to be log-linear with increasing returns in E. The focus of the present 
analysis is however on the individual choice of education, and thus diminishing returns 
are more plausible. 
The representative household is assumed to maximize utility in   subject to 
the budget constraint 
E L L C h l , , ,
E L E H E L qC h h l l M Z Z      ) ( ) ( E L E H L l h h l l ) ( ) ( M Z Z Z      .
Education has a cost in forgone earnings, which is captured by  E l Z . Monetary costs 
of education like college fees come on top of these and are modelled by  E M . The 
effective (unit) cost of education is given by  M Z S  { l . Finally, q is the consumer 
price of consumption. All prices are after tax and subsidy, and the question is which 
combination of taxes and subsidies is second-best efficient. 
It must be stressed that the model assumes two separate time constraints, one for 
nonqualified labour and one for qualified labour. A more structured model would have 
to differentiate between two explicit lifetime periods, with the household providing 
nonqualified labour when young and qualified labour when old (Bovenberg and 
Jacobs, 2001). Not to differentiate consumption C implicitly requires utility of 
consumption to be homothetic and weakly separable from leisure. 
The analysis relies on the dual approach to optimal taxation. This means that the focus 
is shifted from the household’s (indirect) utility function to its (net) expenditure 
function. The task of minimizing (net) expenditures subject to an exogenous utility 
constraint is best solved in a two-step approach. At the first step rent income derived 
from education is maximized while keeping the level of qualified labour supply,  , h L7
fixed. Let rent income be denoted by  ) , , ( h h L Y S Z ] ) ( [ max E L E H h h E S Z  { , and the 
optimal amount of education by  ) , , ( h h L E S Z . Note that the primary source of rent 
income is education and its diminishing return. The qualified-labour supply increases 
rent income only indirectly via increased incentives for education. Let the social cost 
of qualified labour be denoted by  , and the effective social cost of education by p.
Clearly,
h w
) , , ( ) , , ( h h h h L p w E L E   S Z  holds if  h h w p/ /   Z S . In what follows 
h h w p/ /   Z S  is interpreted as the condition guaranteeing an efficient choice of 
education relative to the given value of  . For the sake of brevity, we refer simply to 
efficiency in education whenever 
h L
h h w p/ /   Z S  holds.  
The expenditure function is defined as 
{ ) ; , , , ( u q e h l M Z Z )] , , ( min[ h l h l l L Y L qC M Z Z Z      in  h l L L C , ,
           such that  . u L L C U h l t ) , , (
Hotelling’s lemma yields  , where  C eq   ) ; , , , ( u q C C h l M Z Z    solves the optimization 
and where the subscript q denotes a partial derivative. One likewise derives the 









. Just like C, the functions   and   are 
Hicksian ones to be evaluated at 
l L h L
M Z Z , , , h l q , and u. As a result, the fully specified 
education function reads  )) ; , , , ( , , ( u q L E E h l h l h M Z Z M Z Z    .
3. Policy instruments 
The analysis studies the efficient mix of three policy instruments. The characteristic of 
the benchmark regime is that consumption is taxed. As it turns out, it is convenient to 
define the tax rate t in inclusive form. Treating consumption as a numéraire good with 
a producer price of one, this means that t satisfies the condition q(1ít) = 1. In other 
words, the base of the consumption tax includes the tax payment. The second 
instrument is a tax  l W  on nonqualified labour. It is convenient to define this tax in 8
exclusive form. This requires  l l l w Z W ) 1 (    , where   stands for the wage rate before 
tax. In the benchmark regime, qualified labour is assumed to remain untaxed: 
l w
h h w   Z .
Given that consumption is taxable, nothing is gained by introducing a tax  h W  on 
qualified labour. It would only provide a redundant instrument which could be 
duplicated by an appropriate choice of the three other policy instruments. If qualified-
labour income remains untaxed, a negative (positive)  l W  can be interpreted as implying 
progressive (regressive) taxation of labour income. The third and final instrument is a 
subsidy to education, s. This is again defined in exclusive form, requiring  M ) 1 ( s f    ,
where f is the monetary social cost of education. All social costs,  , , and f, are 
treated as exogenous parameters of the planner’s optimization. There is a need to raise 
tax revenue in order to finance exogenous government expenditures. 
l w h w



















By invoking Hotelling’s lemma, this can be written as 
T =  M M Z e f e w e q l l l q ) ( ) ( ) 1 (      .     (1) 
The social planner is assumed to maximize tax revenue T subject to the condition that 
private net expenditure remains constant at zero level, e=0. A set of instruments t, l W ,
and s is said to be second-best efficient if it solves the planner’s maximization 
problem. As it turns out, the effective subsidy to the cost of education will play a key 
role in characterizing efficient policy. The effective subsidy is denoted by V  and 
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1 1 W
M Z S
holds by definition, efficiency in education holds in the benchmark regime with 













  .        ( 2 )  9
Efficiency in education hence requires subsidizing (taxing) the monetary cost of 
education if labour income is taxed progressively (regressively) with respect to 
qualification.
4. Efficient education policy 
Maximizing government’s net tax revenue T in t, l W , and s, subject to a balanced-
budget constraint on the taxpayer (e=0), yields a problem that can easily be solved by 
applying standard Lagrangian technique. Maximizing in t, l W , and s is obviously 
equivalent to maximizing in  l q Z , , and M . After taking partial derivatives with respect 
to M Z , , l q  and after eliminating the Lagrange multiplier, one ends up with a system of 
















































































































MM M ) (  .  (4) 
This system is best restated in a form that admits interpretation in the spirit of Ramsey. 
For this purpose define the derivation operator ' to be applied to functions 
) ; , , ( u q X X l M Z    as follows: 
M M Z X f X w X q X l l l q ) ( ) ( ) 1 (      { ' .     (5) 
Making use of the  -notation, it is shown in the Appendix that the system of 

















.           ( 7 )  10
This shows that efficiency is achieved if the policy induces equiproportionate 
reductions in consumption C, education E, and nonqualified labour   when all these 
behavioural functions are interpreted in the Hicksian sense. 
l L
Proposition 1: Efficient policy requires equiproportionate reductions in consumption, 
education, and nonqualified labour. 
It is informative to restate (6) and (7) in still another form by making use of elasticities 








) ( / / q E q Ll t H H    = ) ( / / l l l E L l Z Z H H W   +  ) ( / / M M H H E Ll s  ,    (6c)
) ( / / q E q C t H H    = ) ( / / l l E C l Z Z H H W    + ) ( / / M M H H E C s  .    (7c)
This form draws attention to the question of which values the policy instruments t, l W ,
and s should take on in the optimum. A remarkably strong result is obtained if the 
individual earnings function is assumed to be isoelastic in education:  ,
K hE E H   ) (
1  K .
Proposition 2: If the individual earnings function is isoelastic, it is efficient not to 
distort the choice of education: V =0.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The generality of Proposition 2 is striking. Beyond 
the standard regularity assumptions of household optimization, there are no additional 
ones needed to constrain the choice of utility functions. However, isoelasticity of the 
individual earnings function is indispensable. It is needed to prove the following 
remark, of which the proof of Proposition 2 makes heavy use. The proof is again 
relegated to the Appendix. 11
Remark 1:  Assuming  ,
K hE E H   ) ( 1  K , one obtains q Y / H  =  q E / H  and   
     x Y / H  =  x E / H +
M Z  l
x      for l x Z M,   .     (8) 
According to the remark, isoelasticity of H allows one to translate relative changes in 
education into relative changes in the rent income of education according to the stated 
simple formulae. 
Proposition 2 is strongly suggestive of a result derived by Bovenberg and Jacobs 
(2005) and by Jacobs and Bovenberg (2006). These authors equally identify 
circumstances under which the choice of education should remain undistorted. There 
are notable differences, however. Bovenberg and Jacobs focus on the optimal trade-off 
between equity and efficiency when skill formation is endogenous, and they enlarge 
the set of policy instruments by assuming that a poll tax is available. In substituting the 
equity objective for the objective of generating tax revenue, their analysis goes beyond 
the present one. On the other hand, these authors are only able to derive efficiency of 
education for a scenario in which the costs of education are purely monetary ones. 
Costs of forgone earnings are ruled out. It is as if nonqualified labour   were 
exogenously fixed. As a result, education E degenerates to an intermediate good and – 
in contrast to the authors’ own suggestions in Jacobs et al. (2006) – the production 
efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) applies. This is different here. 
Proposition 2 holds for costs of forgone earnings and hence for a scenario for which 
Bovenberg and Jacobs fail to derive any efficiency result. 
l L
The analysis of Bovenberg and Jacobs seems to suggest that Proposition 2 is much less 
robust than the production efficiency theorem. The proposition holds here where the 
government is assumed to meet fiscal needs, while it apparently does not extend to the 
setting integrating an equity objective. This kind of conclusion gains support from 
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001). That paper is an earlier version of Bovenberg and 
Jacobs (2005), and it comes closer to the present analysis by additionally modelling 
forgone earnings. The paper shows that it is not optimal to leave education undistorted 
if individuals differ with respect to the productivity of qualified labour,  , and if  h w12
efficiency has to be traded off against equity. In Section 9 it is however argued that 
this may not be the end of the story. There is evidence that redistributive policy just 
needs well-designed instruments, and if these are available, Proposition 2 is 
conjectured to survive. 
Proposition 2 requires setting V =0. According to (2) this can be ensured by either 
subsidizing the monetary cost of education and taxing labour income progressively 
with respect to qualification or by doing just the reverse, i.e., by taxing the monetary 
cost of education and taxing labour income regressively. The former strategy is clearly 
the more conventional one, found throughout the world. It will be shown next that the 
competing strategy is more efficient. This will first be shown by means of an example. 
5. An Example 
Assume quasi-linear utility,  ) ( ) ( h l L V L V C U   { , equally elastic disutility of labour, 
1 , ) ( 1 ! {  Q Q
Q
L L V , and isoelastic returns from education,  ,
K E E H   ) ( K <1. It turns 
out that the problem is well behaved only in the sense that conditions of second order 
are fulfilled if KQ < 1. The specific appeal of this example comes from vanishing 
income effects. Maximizing the household’s utility yields the following conditions of 





, ) ( ' ) ( h




, and S Z   h h L E H ) ( ' . Solving these 


























































a . This implies the following elasticities: 




















  for  M Z , l x   .








Hence it is efficient to tax nonqualified labour,  l W >0, if consumption is taxed as well, 
t>0. Furthermore,  l W  increases in t and in the elasticities of the individual earnings 
function and the disutility of labour. The following section is an attempt to generalize 
the efficiency result concerning positivity of  l W . Before proceeding, note that  l W  is a 
function of the consumption tax rate and independent of the wage rates   (i=l,h).
This will be interpreted below as evidence that Proposition 2 may well extend to a 
setting where the government targets an equity objective. More precisely, the planner 
will not trade off equity against efficiency in education if the necessary policy 
instruments are available. 
i w
6. The double dividend of taxing labour income regressively 
According to Proposition 2, efficient policy should refrain from distorting human-
capital investment. In more technical terms, when setting t, l W , and s, the planner 
should respect V =0  M Z S         l l p f w  as a constraint. On substituting  p   S ,
the expenditure function takes the form  { ) ; , , ( u q e h l Z Z )] , , ( min[ h h l l L p Y L qC Z Z  
in   such that  . In this case, Hotelling’s lemma yields  h l L L C , , u L L C U h l t ) , , ( C eq  
and , so that the government’s tax revenue can be written as  l l L e   
T =  fE
s
s














   =  E f E L w C q l l l ) ( ) )( ( ) 1 ( M Z      
   =  E p L w C q l l l ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( S Z     
   =  l l l q e w e q ) ( ) 1 (    Z  . 
Consider a marginal change in  l Z  when starting from  l l w   Z  0   l W . The change is 









. The effect that such a marginal reform has on government revenue is 
captured by 14
l l w l d
dT
  Z Z
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e q ) 1 (
= l L
q
q 1  [ q C H  -  q Ll H ] . 
The bracketed expression on the RHS is negative if, and only if, the direct effect that a 
change in q has on consumption is stronger than the indirect effect that q has on the 
supply of nonqualified labour: 
q C H  <  q Ll H   .           ( A 1 )  
The assumption (A1) holds if the demand for consumption and nonqualified leisure is 
not too substitutional. (A1) fails to hold if nonqualified labour reacts strongly and 
negatively to an increase in q, i.e., if nonqualified leisure reacts strongly and positively 
to an increase in q. For constant utility the latter is conceivable only if both 
consumption and nonqualified leisure decrease in q. If, instead, the demand for 
consumption is complementary to nonqualified leisure, then the RHS is positive while 
the LHS is negative, and (A1) holds trivially. 
Proposition 3: Assume (A1), and consider a marginal tax on nonqualified labour 
which is compensated by a decrease in the consumption tax and by a 
marginal tax on the monetary cost of education which restores efficiency in 
education. Such a reform enhances efficiency. 
Consider a scenario in which consumption remains untaxed and in which qualified 
labour is taxed instead at the rate  h W . One way of subsidizing education is by granting 
tax deductibility to monetary costs. The question then arises at what rate and to what 15
extent deductibility should be granted. Corollary 1 provides an answer. The choice of 
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 implies  V  s .
Corollary 1: Assume (A1) and a tax on nonqualified-labour income which marginally 
exceeds the tax  h W  on qualified labour. Efficiency is enhanced if the 
effective cost of education is subsidized at the level of  h W . This requires 
setting s< l h W W  . In other words, it is efficient not to grant full tax 
deductibility to the monetary cost of education. 
Of the two options (i) subsidizing the monetary cost of education and taxing labour 
income progressively and (ii) taxing the monetary cost of education and taxing labour 
income regressively, the latter tends to be the more efficient policy. The intuition is 
straightforward, and there is a strong parallel with the double-dividend hypothesis (in 
weak form) known from environmental taxation (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg and de 
Mooij, 1994). According to this hypothesis, it is more efficient to encourage socially 
desirable behaviour by taxing non-compliance than by subsidizing compliance. By 
taxing non-compliance, which means supplying nonqualified labour to the market in 
the present framework, tax revenue is increased, which allows one to decrease the 
overall level of distorting taxes. The competing policy would mean subsidizing 
compliance in the form of education, which however requires increasing revenue via 
distorting taxes. 
By taxing nonqualified labour income more heavily, the household is induced to 
reduce  and to increase E. Note however that this shift in the use of time is not 
induced by subsidizing the monetary cost of education, but by giving incentives to 
E Ll 16
substitute qualified labour for nonqualified labour. By setting incentives to increase 
at the cost of  , incentives to increase E are given indirectly. 
h L
l L
7. Third-best policies 
Policy makers will find it little appealing to tax labour income regressively with 
respect to qualification. The conflict with equity is obvious. Hence a natural question 
is to ask which policy is efficient in a third-best sense if labour income cannot be taxed 
regressively for exogenous political reasons. The answer requires a more thorough 
analysis than can be given here. This section is meant to give tentative answers only 
and to indicate connections to the literature. 
7.1 Taxing labour income proportionally 
The most straightforward way of excluding regressive taxation of labour income is to 
assume proportional taxation. In the benchmark case this can be modelled by 
excluding l W  from the set of available policy instruments. Hence, assume  l l w   Z , and 
focus on the efficient choice of t and s or of q and M . Government’s net tax revenue 











By Hotelling’s lemma, this can be written as 
T =  M M e f e q q ) ( ) 1 (    .
Consider a marginal change in M  when starting from  f   M  s=0. The change is 
compensated in q subject to the budget constraint e=0. The latter implies 







i.e., an increase in s must be compensated by an increase in t. The total variation of tax 
revenue is captured by 17
f d
dT





















































M ) 1 (
           = E
q
q 1  [ q E H  -  q C H ] . 
The bracketed expression on the RHS is negative if the elasticity of education is larger 
in absolute terms than the elasticity of consumption with respect to the price of 
consumption, 
q E H  <  q C H   .          ( A 2 )  
Proposition 4: Introducing a marginal subsidy to the monetary cost of education and 
compensating this by a marginal increase in the consumption tax enhances 
efficiency if, and only if, (A2) holds. 
The assumption (A2) looks different from (A1). Closer inspection, however, reveals 
that the two assumptions are equivalent if the individual earnings function is isoelastic. 
Remark 2: If  , the assumptions (A1) and (A2) are equivalent. 
K hE E H   ) (
The equivalence is easily proved as follows. By differentiating the expenditure 
function Y L qC e l l     Z  with respect to q and by making use of  , one obtains C eq  
hq L lq l q L Y L qC
h    Z   .        ( 9 )  18
Relying on e=0, some simple algebraic manipulation yields equivalence of (A1) and 
the inequality  q C H  >  q Y H . By Remark 1, equality of  q Y H  and  q E H  holds if the 
individual earnings function is isoelastic. This proves Remark 2.
Corollary 2: Assume (A1) and an isoelastic earnings function. Introducing a marginal 
subsidy for the monetary cost of education and compensating this by a 
marginal increase in the consumption tax enhances efficiency. 
The intuition for this result is as follows. The consumption tax reduces the demand for 
consumption. Utility remains constant only if the labour supplies   and/or   are 
reduced as well. If qualified labour reacts negatively, incentives to invest in education 
are weakened. This case then calls for subsidizing the monetary cost of education. 
However, the taxpayer could also react by reducing nonqualified labour. If this effect 
is strong, then (A1) holds with reversed inequality sign and it is efficient to tax the 
monetary cost of education. However, this is the less likely case. 
h L l L
From an a priori point of view, the case for subsidizing education is not that obvious. 
See also the discussion in Section 8. Education is a factor generating quasi-rent income 
which cannot be fully taxed away. There are results in the literature suggesting that 
policy should not encourage profit-generating behaviour if the profit accrues to the 
private sector. More precisely, it may well be efficient to tax factors when they 
generate pure profit and pure profit cannot be taxed away. See e.g. Huizinga and 
Nielsen (1997). In the present context, this might have given support to the expectation 
that tax efficiency calls for taxing the cost of education (Richter, 2006). This is so 
because education generates non-taxable rent income and this effect conflicts with tax 
efficiency in a framework with distortionary taxation. Proposition 4 invalidates this 
kind of reasoning. 
In the present framework a consumption tax is perfectly equivalent to a proportional 
tax on labour income,  W W W {   h l . Given such proportionality of labour taxation, 
subsidizing the monetary cost of education translates into choosing a rate s which 
marginally exceeds rate W . If subsidization is provided by means of granting tax 19
deduction to the monetary cost of education, the rate of deduction should exceed one 
hundred percent. 
7.2 Taxing capital income 
By investing in one’s own human capital, future consumption is increased at the cost 
of current consumption. The same effect is reached by saving out of nonqualified 
labour income. If the return to saving is taxed, this way of providing for the future 
becomes less attractive. Hence taxing capital income sets incentives to reduce the 
market supply of nonqualified labour and to substitute qualified labour for 
nonqualified labour. As is well known, there are many further effects of taxing capital 
income (Trostel, 1993). Still, the effect of discriminating against saving is a major one 
and one which is easily integrated in the present analysis. Just assume that lifetime 
falls into two explicit periods. In the first one, the household has to divide non-leisure 
time between education, E, and labour supplied to the market,  íE. For the sake of 
simplicity assume that all consumption is shifted to the second period. As a result, all 
income earned in the first period must be spent either on education or on savings: 
l L
E L E E L S l l l l l ) ( ) ( M Z Z M Z         .
Second-period consumption is constrained by income earned: 
h h L E H S qC ) ( Z U     . 
As before, q is the price of consumption, while U  is the gross rate of return to saving. 
For some exogenous political reasons let the planner be constrained to tax labour 
income progressively,  h h l l w w   ! Z Z , . Assume, furthermore, that the only policy 
instruments available are a tax on consumption, q>1; a tax/subsidy to the monetary 
costs of education, M zf; and a tax on capital income, U <r. By applying the same 
technique as before and by assuming an isoelastic earnings function, one can show that 
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This condition is clearly fulfilled if capital and the monetary costs of education are 
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M  results. Starting from this situation and 
assuming (A1), the following reform enhances efficiency: U  is decreased marginally, 
and this decrease is compensated by variations in M  and q so that (10) continues to 
hold and the utility of the taxpayer remains constant. The result suggests that a positive 
tax on capital income has the potential to alleviate the negative incentives that 
progressive taxation of labour income has on human-capital investment. This confirms 
earlier conclusions of Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005). The conclusions are not, 
however, fully compatible with Nielsen and Sörensen (1997). In fact, they are just the 
logical reverse of what Nielsen and Sörensen try to convey. Those authors argue in 
favour of a policy which aims at discouraging human-capital investment. They derive 
their recommendation by keeping the capital income tax exogenous, by ignoring 
monetary costs of education, and by then proving optimality of progressivity in labour 
income taxation. This result is compatible with (10) only if f=0 as then  r  U  implies 
h l h l w w / / ! Z Z . The result does not however hold if f>0. In this case it is clearly 
more efficient to sustain efficiency in education by taxing the monetary costs of 
education than by subsidizing non-qualified labour income.  
8. To what extent are education subsidies efficiency-enhancing? 
The role of subsidies paid to education and the effect such subsidies have on the 
equity–efficiency trade-off in the taxation of labour income is a big topic in the 
literature. The conclusions derived are irritatingly opposing. According to Bovenberg 
and Jacobs (2005) “redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese twins”. 
Subsidies on education are shown to alleviate the tax distortions on learning induced 
by redistributive policies. The more eager the distributive objectives are, the more 
strongly policy must rely on educational subsidies. Quite to the contrary, Wigger 
(2003, 2004) proves that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing a 
nonlinear income tax with a subsidy to the cost of education. Although the present 21
paper focuses on efficiency only, it helps to understand these seemingly conflicting 
views of education subsidies. 
From the literature on the optimal labour taxation in the Mirrlees tradition it is well 
known that highly productive labour income should not be taxed at the margin if the 
tax planner wants to redistribute income between two productivity types of individuals 
and if low and high types cannot be identified on an individual basis. In present 
notation this requires setting  0   h W . Relying on this famous result and on quasi-linear 
utility functions, Wigger proves that a subsidy to the monetary cost of education 
effectively lowers social welfare. Hence it is optimal to set s< 0   h W . This comes close 
to Corollary 1 above. In fact, Corollary 1 is stronger than Wigger’s result in that it 
relies on weaker assumptions. Utility functions need not be quasi-linear. They have to 
satisfy (A1) only. Furthermore, the present analysis makes clear that s< h W  follows 
from pure efficiency considerations, while  0   h W  follows from the government’s need 
to respect an informational participation constraint when redistributing income from 
high to low productivity types of individuals.  
Bovenberg and Jacob’s (2005) results are less easy to summarize. The reason is that 
these authors study education subsidies in varying frameworks. The most general one 
allows for costs of forgone leisure. With respect to the feasible choice of utility 
functions it is even more general than Wigger’s analysis. The price Bovenberg and 
Jacobs pay is a loss in the simplicity and clarity of results. They are only able to prove 
that non-pecuniary educational costs may have an increasing effect on optimal 
education subsidies, especially if they are complementary to work effort. In the less 
ambitious part of their paper, Bovenberg and Jacobs ignore non-pecuniary educational 
costs. They demonstrate that optimal subsidies on education ensure efficiency in 
human-capital accumulation even if the government values equity and pursues a 
redistributive policy. If tax rates on labour increase, optimal subsidies on education 
should do so as well in order to alleviate the tax distortions on learning. 
Such a conclusion comes close to Propositions 3 and 4 above. Proposition 3 suggests 
that it is efficient to combine regressive taxation of labour income with a tax on the 
monetary cost of education. If, however, equity concerns rule out the use of regressive 22
taxation, then efficiency requires subsidizing education, as stated by Proposition 4. As 
has already been argued, the present analysis should however not be considered a 
replication of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). Bovenberg and Jacobs only derive an 
efficiency result when ignoring non-pecuniary educational costs. In this case, 
education degenerates to an intermediate good, and the production efficiency theorem 
of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) is applicable. In contrast, Proposition 2 holds even in 
the case when education is a leisure-time consuming activity generating rent income 
that cannot be fully taxed away. 
In Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) the argument runs as follows. Because of distributive 
concerns it is efficient to rely on a distortional tax on labour income. As a poll tax 
allows skimming off pure ability rents, the production efficiency theorem is 
applicable, and this requires leaving educational investment undistorted. In the present 
analysis distortions arise from taxing consumption. A poll tax is not available, but 
labour income can be taxed according to qualification, which is not the case in 
Bovenberg et al. (2005). Ability rents accrue to the taxpayer, and yet it is efficient to 
leave the educational choice undistorted. 
One may well debate whether tax rates should be allowed to depend on educational 
characteristics or not. From a positive point of view it is difficult to justify any 
dependence. No country is known to condition tax rates on educational characteristics 
explicitly. This common reluctance is however more and more questioned from a 
normative perspective. Most prominent is the idea of introducing graduate taxes; see 
e.g. Garcia-Penalos and Wälde (2000) or Poutvaara (2004). Such taxes are attractive in 
that school qualification and university degrees are certainly not difficult to verify by 
tax authorities. Even more, failure to use this information is conceptually not really 
plausible, given the framework of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). These authors 
assume that the government can subsidize individual monetary costs of education. 
Hence the government should be able to differentiate tax rates according to subsidies 
received. If not, the framework is not too far from the one discussed in Section 7.1. It 
relies on the assumption that labour income tax rates cannot be differentiated 
according to qualification for some unspecified exogenous reason:  W W W {   h l . The 
analysis in Section 7.1 shows that, given non-differentiation, the monetary cost of 23
education should be subsidized at a rate s that exceeds W . This result confirms 
simulation results of Trostel (1996). It however contradicts Bovenberg and Jacobs 
(2005), who prove s=W  in the less ambitious part of their paper. This is further 
evidence to the claim that the results of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and the ones 
presented here are only similar in spirit but different in substance. 
As has already been stressed, Proposition 3 is best interpreted with reference to the 
double-dividend hypothesis known from the literature on environmental taxation. If it 
is socially desirable to encourage education at the margin, one should do so by taxing 
noncompliant behaviour and not by subsidizing compliant behaviour. This is the so-
called weak form of the double-dividend hypothesis. See Goulder (1995). The first 
dividend is the positive effect on education, and the second dividend comes from the 
generated revenue, which can be used to cut back distorting taxes. There have been 
other, less convincing attempts in the literature to relate double dividends to optimal 
education policy. Jacobs (2005) suggests speaking of a double dividend if education 
subsidies produce more equality in before-tax incomes and also generate efficiency 
gains in taxation. He refers to Dur and Teulings (2004). These authors argue in favour 
of educational subsidies. By promoting education and relying on general-equilibrium 
effects, the distortionary cost of progressive taxation may be reduced. According to 
Jacobs (2005), a “double dividend” of education subsidies generating more equality in 
before-tax wages through general-equilibrium effects and lower distorting tax rates is 
however not likely to occur. Corollary 1 of the present paper is another blow against 
the thesis of Dur et al. The monetary cost of education should not even be granted full 
tax deductibility if labour income can be taxed according to qualification. In other 
words, for pure reasons of efficiency, education should be taxed and not subsidized on 
a net basis. The conjecture is that this result perfectly extends to a general-equilibrium 
framework.24
9. Efficiency in education and distributive policy 
According to Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001), efficiency in education fails to be optimal 
when education causes costs of forgone earnings and when there are distributional 
concerns. If nothing more could be said, this result would provide a critical argument 
against the practical relevance of Proposition 2. However, more can be said when 
taking a closer look at the example discussed in Section 5. According to this example 
it is efficient not to distort human-capital investment and to tax nonqualified labour 
income at a rate  l W  which is a function of the consumption tax rate but else 
independent of the wage profile   (i=l,h). Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001) model 
taxpayers’ heterogeneity by assuming a non-degenerate distribution of the productivity 
of qualified labour as measured by  . Taxpayers are assumed to differ neither by 
and nor by the elasticity of the individual earnings function, 
i w
h w l w
K . In the example of 
Section 5, differences in   would not show up in the efficient ratio of  h w l W  to t but in 
their absolute values only. This observation suggests conjecturing that an optimizing 
planner would choose to address equity concerns by relying on a personal tax on 
lifetime consumption. This is not beyond what economists consider a reasonable idea. 
The only problem is that  l W  would have to increase in t. The more productive the 
taxpayer is, the more regressively his or her labour income has to be taxed with respect 
to qualification. This recommendation is clearly difficult to translate into practical 
policy. When the taxpayer is young and not qualified, the necessary information 
concerning  is typically missing. The idea of differentiating  h w l W  according to   will 
fail in practice. If however a non-differentiating tax 
h w
l W  is applied, the planner runs into 
a conflict. Equity calls for high tax rates  h W  on labour income when   is high, while 
efficiency calls for just the reverse monotonicity. In practice, the planner has no choice 
but to compromise on efficiency in education when enhancing equity. Although this 
conclusion is not really surprising, it makes one point clear: The practical limits to the 
applicability of Proposition 2 are not set by equity concerns as such, but by the lack of 
information about future productivity differentials before individuals start to reap the 
returns to their human-capital investments.
h w25
This discussion deserves to be qualified in one notable respect. The strongest predictor 
of educational success is known to be the family background. Hence parents’ income 
should be an empirically informative signal of  . Insofar as this is the case, it gives 
reason to tax nonqualified labour income at a rate which increases with parents’
income. Although this is a daring idea, it is theoretically not without appeal. It is an 
idea that may have practical potential in relaxing the conflict between equity and 
efficiency in education. A more conventional policy is to subsidize the education of 
highly productive individuals at a higher rate than the education of less productive 
individuals. The German practice of financing university education by taxes and 
leaving it to the private sector to finance apprenticeships may well be interpreted along 
these lines. Such a policy, however, fails to be second-best efficient. 
h w
10. Summary 
The policy conclusions derived from this paper’s analysis are as unambiguous as they 
are unpopular. They are unambiguous in the sense that it could be shown under fairly 
broad assumptions to be efficient not to distort educational choice when education 
generates ability rents. Distortions should be tolerated only in the supply of labour. 
Given that the necessary policy instruments are available, it is second-best efficient to 
tax labour income regressively with respect to qualification and to tax the monetary 
cost of education at a level that allows one to sustain efficiency in education. Such a 
policy aims at leaving education undistorted while setting incentives for substituting 
qualified labour for nonqualified labour. The intuition reminds one of the double-
dividend hypothesis well known from environmental taxation. According to this 
hypothesis it is more efficient to tax noncompliant behaviour than to subsidize 
compliant behaviour. In the present context noncompliant behaviour takes the form of 
supplying nonqualified labour to the market, while compliant behaviour refers to non-
leisure time spent on education. The results derived in this paper allow one to give a 
consolidated interpretation of various other results that have been produced in the 
literature and that tend to be contradictory and confusing. 26
The policy implications derived from this paper’s analysis are certainly not very 
popular. Not many people would be willing to tax nonqualified labour more heavily 
than qualified labour. The implications are, however, not so unreasonable if interpreted 
with care. There are two options of careful and reasonable interpretation: a defensive 
one and an offensive one. According to the offensive interpretation, the analysis 
suggests pursuing the equity objective by redistributing lifetime consumption and 
providing incentives to restore efficiency in educational choice. A theoretically 
appealing way to achieve this goal is to tax nonqualified labour at a rate that increases 
in a reliable predicator of the returns to education. Parents’ income may be a good 
candidate. Although it is a daring idea to tax nonqualified labour income according to 
parents’ income, it certainly deserves to be discussed in more detail than could be done 
here. According to the defensive interpretation, no particular policy recommendation is 
derived. The primary value of the analysis is seen in stressing the social efficiency cost 
of progressive taxation. Progressive taxation with respect to qualification is just the 
opposite of what is needed to encourage human-capital investment. This negative 
incentive effect magnifies the negative disincentives for labour choice highlighted by 
Mirrlees (1971) and others. 
A final remark concerns the simplicity of the model used in the present paper. One 
must admit that major results do not hold if the individual earnings function fails to be 
isoelastic. Even if this assumption is accepted, it is not clear whether the results 
derived hold in more realistic settings. The time structure has only been implicit and 
rudimentary, and the accumulation of physical capital has not been modelled at all. 
Furthermore, labour has been assumed to be immobile, and the model is the one of a 
closed economy. Although such modelling shortcomings cannot be denied, there is 
hope that some of them can be overcome by future research. For example, there is 
evidence (Schuppert, 2007) that efficiency in education is something to which 
jurisdictions should stick even if migration incentives are distorted. Hence, more 
research is needed to find out how robust the policy implications of this paper are. 27
11. Appendix 
The proof of Proposition 1 makes use of  C eq   , ) ( E L e l l     , and  =E. Equation 
(7) is easily seen to be perfectly equivalent to (4). Equation (6) follows just from 
































Remark 1 is only proved for the case in which the equality of elasticities is claimed to 
hold with respect to variations in q. The cases concerning variations in M  and  l Z  are 
proved along the same lines. The definition  ) , , ( h h L Y S Z E HLh h S Z     and the first-
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,  which clearly 
holds if H is isoelastic. 
The proof of Proposition 2 requires some preparatory considerations. Note first that 
(9) holds in more general terms: 
hx L lx l x L Y L qC
h    Z   for M , ,l q x   .       ( 1 1 )  
Making use of (5) and (11), one easily derives 
h L l l L Y L C q
h '   '   ' Z   .         ( 1 2 )  
Assuming (6c) and isoelasticity of H, (7c) is shown to hold if, and only if,  p   S :
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